Effects of message delivery on cross-cultural biosecurity compliance: Insights from experimental simulations.

Background: Effective biosecurity communication of transmission risks and associated protective behaviors can reduce the impacts of infectious diseases in US animal agriculture. Yet, more than 1/5 of animal production workers speak a language other than English at home, and more than 40 percent are less than fluent in English. Communicating with these workers often involves translating into their primary languages. However, communication strategies targeting different cultural groups are not well-understood. Aims: To identify cross-linguistic risk communication strategies to facilitate compliance, we hypothesized that uncertainty avoidance cultures associated with the languages might affect biosecurity compliance contingent upon two additional covariates: (1) the risk of acquiring an infection and (2) the delivery method of the infection risk. Methods: We designed an experimental game simulating a line of separation (LOS) biosecurity tactic in a swine production facility, where participants were tasked with completing tasks inside and outside of the facility. Data were collected using games in the two most spoken languages in the US: English (EN) and Spanish (SP). Participants made binary decisions about whether to use the LOS biosecurity tactic based on the risk information provided. Mixed-effect logistic models were used to test the effects of covariates on using the LOS tactic by different language groups. Results: We found that biosecurity compliance rates of participants who took the experiments in the language associated with high and low uncertainty cultures showed no significant differences. However, there are substantial differences in how risk information is perceived between the two language groups under different infection risks. Specifically, and counterintuitively, SP participants were more risk-averse in gain scenarios but more risk-taking in loss scenarios. These differences are most pronounced in numeric risk messaging, indicating that numbers may not be the best way to communicate risk information regarding biosecurity cross-culturally. Conclusions: When confronted with situational biosecurity decisions, risk perception and preferences vary by language group. Effective biosecurity communication needs to account for these differences and not assume that direct translation of risk messages will result in comparable compliance.

Assessing strategic, tactical, and operational decision-making and risk in a livestock production chain through experimental simulation platforms.

This paper provides a research summary of a series of serious games and simulations that form the basis of an experimental platform for the study of human decision-making and behavior associated with biosecurity across complex livestock production chains. This platform is the first of its kind to address the challenges associated with scaling micro-behavior of biosecurity decision-making to macro-patterns of disease spread across strategic, tactical and operational levels, capturing the roles that facility managers and front-line workers play in making biosecurity decisions under risk and uncertainty. Informational and incentive treatments are tested within each game and simulation. Behavioral theories are used to explain these findings. Results from serious games in the form of behavioral probability distributions are then used to simulate disease incidence and spread across a complex production chain, demonstrating how micro-level behaviors contribute to larger macro-level patterns. In the case of this study, the propensity to adopt micro-level biosecurity practices are applied to a network percolation disease spread model. By presenting the suite of companion models of behavior and disease spread we are able to capture scaling dynamics of complex systems, and in the process, better understand how individual behaviors impact whole systems.

Message Delivery Strategy Influences Willingness to Comply With Biosecurity.

As the Covid-19 pandemic continues worldwide, it has become increasingly clear that effective communication of disease transmission risks associated with protective behaviors is essential, and that communication tactics are not ubiquitously and homogenously understood. Analogous to Covid-19, communicable diseases in the hog industry result in millions of animal deaths and in the United States costs hundreds of millions of dollars annually. Protective behaviors such as preventative biosecurity practices are implemented to reduce these costs. Yet even with the knowledge of the importance of biosecurity, these practices are not employed consistently. The efficacy of biosecurity practices relies on consistent implementation and is influenced by a variety of behavioral factors under the umbrella of human decision-making. Using an experimental game, we collected data to quantify how different messages that described the likelihood of a disease incursion would influence willingness to follow biosecurity practices. Here we show that graphical messages combined with linguistic phrases demarking infection risk levels are more effective for ensuring compliance with biosecurity practices, as contrasted with either simple linguistic phrases or graphical messages with numeric demarcation of risk levels. All three of these delivery methods appear to be more effective than using a simple numeric value to describe probability of infection. Situationally, we saw greater than a 3-fold increase in compliance by shifting message strategy without changing the infection risk, highlighting the importance of situational awareness and context when designing messages.

Behavioural frameworks to understand public perceptions of and risk response to carbon dioxide removal.

The adoption of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies at a scale sufficient to draw down carbon emissions will require both individual and collective decisions that happen over time in different locations to enable a massive scale-up. Members of the public and other decision-makers have not yet formed strong attitudes, beliefs and preferences about most of the individual CDR technologies or taken positions on policy mechanisms and tax-payer support for CDR. Much of the current discourse among scientists, policy analysts and policy-makers about CDR implicitly assumes that decision-makers will exhibit unbiased, rational behaviour that weighs the costs and benefits of CDR. In this paper, we review behavioural decision theory and discuss how public reactions to CDR will be different from and more complex than that implied by rational choice theory. Given that people do not form attitudes and opinions in a vacuum, we outline how fundamental social normative principles shape important intergroup, intragroup and social network processes that influence support for or opposition to CDR technologies. We also point to key insights that may help stakeholders craft public outreach strategies that anticipate the nuances of how people evaluate the risks and benefits of CDR approaches. Finally, we outline critical research questions to understand the behavioural components of CDR to plan for an emerging public response.